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FROM ROWLEY TO ENDREW F.
I. INTRODUCTION
 In 1982, the United States Supreme Court established the standard for school 
districts to provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to students with 
disabilities as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1 
In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court ruled that in order to meet the 
FAPE requirement, school districts were required to provide students with disabilities 
an “educational benefit.”2 Thirty-five years later, in Endrew F. v. Douglas County 
School District RE-1, the Court revisited Rowley and stated that in order to provide a 
FAPE to children with disabilities, school districts must provide an educational 
program that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate 
in light of the child’s circumstances.”3
 Even though Endrew F. articulated a new FAPE standard, the Court emphasized 
that it was not overruling Rowley.4 The Court also took steps to narrow its decision. 
It warned that its new FAPE standard was not an “invitation” to courts to abandon 
the deference the Court gave to state educators in Rowley.5 It also reaffirmed Rowley’s 
ruling that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide equal educational 
opportunities to children with disabilities.6
 The Supreme Court’s adoption of a new FAPE standard combined with its 
cautionary words about Rowley left several questions about Endrew F.’s impact. 
Primary among them was how the lower courts would interpret its FAPE standard. 
Did Endrew F. replace Rowley’s FAPE standard or just restate it? Did Endrew F. set 
a higher FAPE standard than Rowley? Despite the Supreme Court’s denial, did 
Endrew F. open the door for courts to construe the IDEA to provide equal educational 
opportunity for students with disabilities? This article examines Endrew F.’s impact 
by tracing the evolution of FAPE standards among the courts and answers all three 
questions in the affirmative: 1) Endrew F.’s FAPE standard replaced Rowley; 2) it 
strengthened the FAPE standard in a majority of the circuits; and 3) it left the door 
open for the courts to construe the IDEA as requiring equal educational opportunities 
for children with disabilities.
 Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the IDEA’s essential elements, 
including its definition of a FAPE. Part III examines how the Supreme Court 
defined a FAPE in Rowley. Part IV explains the various FAPE standards the circuit 
courts implemented after Rowley. Part V focuses on Endrew F., in which the Court 
explicitly rejected the lowest of these standards and adopted one that appears to be 
1. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982); see also Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–82 (2017) (codifying FAPE at § 1412(a)(1)).
2. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01.
3. 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
4. See id. at 998–99, 1001 (“Mindful that Congress . . . has not materially changed the statutory definition 
of a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly 
at odds with the Court’s analysis in that case.”).
5. Id. at 1001.
6. Id.
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higher than all of the circuit courts except one. Part VI documents how the lower 
courts have implemented Endrew F. Finally, Part VII explores whether Endrew F. 
could lead the courts to adopt the equal opportunity standard that the Court rejected 
nearly forty years ago.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA
 A brief review of the IDEA helps to place the FAPE requirement in context. 
This review includes the IDEA’s background, its federalist structure, its procedural 
requirements, the statutory definition of a FAPE, the least restrictive environment 
requirement, and the IDEA’s remedial options.
 A. The IDEA’s Background
 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,7 a 
movement to create a right to education for children with disabilities was born. The 
movement documented legally sanctioned discriminatory practices by school districts 
that resulted in millions of children with disabilities being shut out from school and 
millions of others warehoused in unsuitable classrooms where they did not receive 
any education.8 Congress passed the IDEA to ensure that children with disabilities 
received an appropriate education.9
 B. The Federalist Structure of the IDEA
 The IDEA provides federal funds to states to assist them in providing education 
to children with disabilities.10 In return, the IDEA requires states to comply with the 
IDEA’s requirements for educating those children, including providing a FAPE.11 
The states generally distribute these funds to local school districts, which are directly 
responsible for meeting the educational needs of children with disabilities.12 Courts 
have cited the Spending Clause13 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause14 as the sources of congressional authority to pass and enforce the IDEA.15
7. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (deciding that segregation in schools based on race deprived students of equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. See Deborah N. Archer & Richard D. Marsico, Special Education Law and Practice: Cases 
and Materials 11 (2017).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2017). 
10. Id. § 1411(a)(1); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982).
11. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993; see § 1412(a)(1).
12. See B.J.S. v. State Educ. Dep’t, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599–600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (ruling that local school 
districts, not states, have the responsibility to provide a FAPE to children with disabilities).
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14. Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
15. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006) (“Congress enacted 
the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause.”); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 n.1 (1989) 
32
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 C. The IDEA’s Procedural Requirements
 The IDEA’s procedural requirements are extensive, taking up a significantly 
larger portion of the statute than its educational requirements. The IDEA requires 
school districts to identify and evaluate children16 to determine whether they have 
one of eleven enumerated disabilities and, by reason of the disability, need special 
education and related services.17 If a child is eligible for special education, the school 
district must create a written individualized education program (IEP) for the child.18 
The IEP is prepared by a team that includes administrators, teachers, and the 
student’s parents.19 It contains a description of the student’s disability, their level of 
academic achievement, annual goals, a description of how their goals will be 
measured, and the special education and related services the student will receive.20
 The IDEA creates an administrative structure for filing complaints and allows 
judicial review of the administrative process. Any party may submit a complaint to the 
relevant school district regarding the “identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such 
child.”21 The school district must provide the opportunity for an impartial 
administrative hearing to any party that files a complaint.22 Any party aggrieved by 
the administrative process can file a complaint in court.23 The reviewing court will 
“receive the record of the administrative proceedings,” accept “additional evidence at 
the request of a party,” and “bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence.”24
 D. The IDEA’s Definition of a FAPE
 The IDEA defines a FAPE as “special education and related services that . . . are 
provided in conformity with the [child’s] individualized education program . . . .”25 
“Special education” is “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet 
(assuming without deciding that Congress passed the IDEA pursuant to its authority under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
17. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). The enumerated disabilities are “intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments . . ., 
speech or language impairments, visual impairments . . ., serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairment, or specific learning disabilities . . . .” 
§ 1401(3)(A)(i).





23. § 1415(i)(2)(A). A civil suit “may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district 
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the unique needs of a child with a disability . . . .”26 Related services include 
“developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to 
assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education . . . .”27 Thus, to 
provide a FAPE, a school district must prepare an IEP that meets a child’s educational 
needs and allows the child to benefit from that education. However, the IDEA does 
not define two of the key phrases in this definition: “meets” and “benefit.”
 E. The Least Restrictive Environment
 The IDEA requires school districts to educate students with disabilities in what 
is known as the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). This means that:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are 
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular 
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.28
The circuit courts have established different tests for determining whether a school 
district has satisfied the LRE requirement. These tests generally require a flexible, 
child-focused analysis to determine whether adequate education in the general 
education classroom can be achieved by using educational supports, and if not, whether 
the school has maximized the child’s participation in other mainstream activities.29
 F. Remedies
 In civil cases, the IDEA gives judges broad authority to “grant such relief as the 
court deems is appropriate.”30 Courts have generally concluded that this provision 
does not allow judges to award monetary damages for IDEA violations.31 Instead, 
the two primary forms of relief in IDEA cases are equitable in nature: reimbursement 




29. See, e.g., P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2008). The term “mainstream” has 
become common parlance for the LRE requirement. See id. at 119 (“Educating a handicapped child in a 
regular education classroom . . . is familiarly known as ‘mainstreaming.’”) (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State 
Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989)).
30. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
31. See Archer & Marsico, supra note 8, at 647–49 (discussing the treatment of the IDEA provision by 
various federal circuit courts).
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not providing a FAPE,32 and compensatory education for services the school district 
did not provide to the child.33
III. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY
 In 1982, the Supreme Court issued Board of Education v. Rowley, its first decision 
about the meaning of a FAPE—indeed, its first decision about the IDEA.34 Rowley 
set the standard for providing a FAPE that would last for thirty-five years.
 A. The Majority Decision
  1. Facts
 Amy Rowley was a deaf elementary school student at Furnace Woods Elementary 
School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District in Peekskill, New York.35 
Even though Amy’s academic performance was better than average and she had 
advanced from grade to grade, she understood “considerably less” in class than if she 
were not deaf, and as a result, was not meeting her full potential.36
 The school district prepared an IEP for Amy that provided that she would be 
educated in a regular education classroom, use an FM hearing device, and receive 
instruction from a tutor for deaf people one hour per day and speech therapy three 
hours per week.37 Amy’s parents disagreed with this IEP and asked the district to 
provide her with a sign-language interpreter in all of her academic classes in place of 
some of the other services, but the district refused.38
 Amy’s parents requested an impartial hearing to challenge the district’s decision. 
They claimed that the district’s failure to provide Amy with a sign-language 
interpreter denied her a FAPE.39 They lost the impartial hearing and the 
administrative appeal, but after challenging the administrative decision in federal 
court, they prevailed—both in the district court and on appeal.40 The district court 
32. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (finding that the Education 
of the Handicapped Act—the former name of the IDEA—authorized courts to order public school 
authorities to reimburse parents for expenditures on private special education).
33. See Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753–54 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[I]mposing liability for compensatory 
educational services . . . is necessary to secure the child’s right to a free appropriate public education.”); 
Archer & Marsico, supra note 8, at 671. Compensatory education is a remedy intended to “place 
disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district’s violations 
of IDEA, by providing the educational services children should have received in the first instance.” 
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
34. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
35. Id. at 184.
36. Id. at 185.
37. Id. at 184.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 185.
40. Id. at 185–86.
35
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ruled, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that the IDEA required Amy’s school 
district to provide Amy with the “opportunity to achieve [her] full potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”41 The district court 
suggested a test to determine whether a school district meets this standard: 1) 
Measure the student’s potential; 2) compare the student’s performance with their 
potential and determine if there is a shortfall; and 3) compare any shortfall with that 
of typically developing children.42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
the meaning of a FAPE under the IDEA.43
  2. The Supreme Court’s Definition of a FAPE
 The Court, in an opinion by Justice William Rehnquist, rejected the district 
court’s definition of a FAPE, stating that the district court developed it without 
reference to the IDEA’s language or its legislative history.44 The Court also rejected 
the Rowleys’ argument that the IDEA requires school districts to provide students 
with disabilities “an equal educational opportunity” as an “entirely unworkable 
standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”45 The Court 
formulated its own definition of a FAPE, but did so in six different ways over the 
course of its opinion:
One: School districts must provide students with disabilities meaningful 
access to education.46
Two: School districts must give students with disabilities access to special 
education.47
Three: The IDEA provides a basic f loor of opportunity to students with 
disabilities.48
Four: School districts must provide some educational benefit to students with 
disabilities.49
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 186.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 189–90.
45. Id. at 198.
46. Id. at 192 (“[I]n seeking to provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the 
States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access 
meaningful.”).
47. Id. at 200 (“Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide 
them with access to a free public education.”).
48. Id. at 201 (“[T]he basic f loor of opportunity provided by the Act consists of access to specialized 
instruction and related services . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 200 (“Implicit in the congressional purpose . . . is the requirement that the education to which 
access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”).
36
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Five: School districts must provide “access to specialized instruction and 
related services which are individually designed to provide educational 
benefit” to students with disabilities.50
Six: School districts must provide “personalized instruction with sufficient 
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction.”51
 These six standards can be organized into four different categories based on the 
amount of education a school district must apparently provide in order to comply 
with the requirements of a FAPE, from more to less:
Level of Benefit Formulation
Meaningful access Formulation One
Educational benefit Formulations Five and Six
Some educational benefit Formulation Four
Access to education Formulations Two and Three
 Thus, Rowley’s various FAPE standards can be seen as requiring school districts 
to provide students with disabilities access to education, some educational benefit, 
educational benefit, or meaningful access to education.52
  3. The Court’s Application of the FAPE Test
 Having defined a FAPE, even imperfectly, the Court declined to adopt a single 
test for determining whether a school district provided a FAPE. Instead, it limited 
its ruling to the facts before it—a child with a disability “who is receiving substantial 
specialized education and related services, and who is performing above average in 
the regular classrooms of a public school system . . . .”53 The Court stated that a child 
in these circumstances is receiving a FAPE if the child’s IEP is “reasonably calculated 
to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”54 The 
Court found that the school district was providing educational services to Amy that 
were calculated to meet her needs and the lower courts were wrong to conclude that 
the IDEA required the school district to provide her with a sign-language 
interpreter.55 Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.56
50. Id. at 201.
51. Id. at 203.
52. This chart and the two that follow in this article admittedly lack scientific or mathematical precision. 
They are based on informed judgments about open-ended and often inconsistent language that describes 
legal standards. Although they lack precision, the charts support broad conclusions. Here, the conclusion 
is that Rowley suggests more than one FAPE standard, and these standards are markedly different.
53. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
54. Id. at 204.
55. See id. at 210.
56. Id.
37
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 B. Concurring Opinion
 Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Based on his reading of the 
IDEA’s legislative history and the intent of Congress, Justice Blackmun suggested a 
FAPE standard similar to what the district court articulated and the Rowleys 
pursued: “whether [the child’s] program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity 
to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal” to the 
one afforded her typically developing classmates.57 Justice Blackmun concluded that 
the school district satisfied this standard for Amy.58
 C. Dissenting Opinion
 Justice Byron White, joined by Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood 
Marshall, dissented. Justice White analyzed the IDEA’s legislative history and 
concluded that it demonstrated a congressional intent to provide far more education 
to children with disabilities than the majority’s standard.59 Justice White identified 
terms in the IDEA’s legislative history describing the education that Congress 
intended, including “full educational opportunity,” “equal educational opportunity,” 
and “maximum potential.”60 Based on the legislative history, Justice White concluded 
that the IDEA requires that children with disabilities be given an equal opportunity 
to learn.61 Since Amy understood less than half of what happened in the classroom, 
he found that she did not have an equal opportunity to learn and thus was deprived 
of a FAPE.62
IV. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF ROWLEY
 Given Rowley’s various FAPE formulations, the circuit courts had discretion in 
deciding which FAPE standard to adopt. Not surprisingly, courts in all but the Sixth 
Circuit—the only one to articulate the standard in light of the child’s potential—
adopted standards that fell within Rowley’s various categories. The standard for each 
circuit is described below:
District of Columbia Circuit: The D.C. Circuit utilized the “some educational 
benefit” standard.63
57. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
58. Id. at 212.
59. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 213–14.
61. Id. at 215.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rowley standard 
requires only that schools provide ‘some educational benefit’ . . . .”) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200); 
Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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First Circuit: Appeals courts in the First Circuit phrased the FAPE standard 
somewhat differently. Some courts required a meaningful educational 
benefit.64 Others required some educational benefit.65
Second Circuit: Appeals courts in the Second Circuit also phrased the FAPE 
standard differently. Cases differed on whether they defined the FAPE 
standard as requiring meaningful access or a benefit.66
Third Circuit: The Third Circuit required school districts to provide a 
significant and meaningful benefit.67
Fourth Circuit: The Fourth Circuit required school districts to provide 
meaningful education to children with disabilities, which it defined as “more 
than minimal, trivial progress.”68
Fifth Circuit: The Fifth Circuit’s position was that the IDEA does not 
require states to provide the best education, but that the IDEA’s basic f loor of 
opportunity means that the child’s IEP must be likely to allow the child to 
progress and not regress, and that the progress must be meaningful, meaning 
more than trivial.69
Sixth Circuit: The Sixth Circuit, the only one to exceed the standards 
articulated by Rowley, held that an IEP must provide “a meaningful educational 
64. See, e.g., Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012); D.B. v. Esposito, 
675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Hence, to comply with the IDEA, an IEP must be reasonably 
calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit.”). 
65. Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An IEP need 
only supply ‘some educational benefit,’ not an optimal or ideal level of educational benefit, in order to 
survive judicial scrutiny.”).
66. Compare T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To decide whether an 
IEP complies with the IDEA . . . [it must be asked] whether it was ‘reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefits.’”), with M.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he door of public education must be opened in a meaningful way. That is, . . . [it] must 
provide the opportunity for more than only trivial advancement.”), and Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (“IDEA requires states to provide a disabled child with 
meaningful access to an education, but it cannot guarantee totally successful results.”).
67. See, e.g., Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 581 F. App’x 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A] school district . . . 
must supply an education that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit to the child.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); Mary Courtney T. v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009); Shore 
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate 
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 183–84 (3d Cir. 1998).
68. O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Using [the term] ‘meaningful’ [is] 
simply another way to characterize the requirement that an [IEP] must provide a child with more than 
minimal, trivial progress.”); see also Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(“Clearly, Congress did not intend that a school system could discharge its duty under the [IDEA] by 
providing a program that produces some minimal academic achievement, no matter how trivial.”).
69. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The FAPE required by 
the IDEA ‘need not be the best possible one, . . . [but] must be likely to produce progress, not regression 
or trivial educational advancement.’”); Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808–09 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247–48 (5th Cir. 1997).
39
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 63 | 2018/19
benefit gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue. . . . Accordingly, an 
IEP is insufficient if it provides ‘only trivial educational benefit.’”70
Seventh Circuit: In the Seventh Circuit, school districts were required to 
provide educational benefit, defined as more than just trivial progress.71
Eighth Circuit: The Eighth Circuit utilized both “some educational benefit” 
and “slight or de minimis” FAPE standards.72
Ninth Circuit: The Ninth Circuit utilized the educational benefit standard.73 
Tenth Circuit: The Tenth Circuit interpreted “some educational benefit” to 
mean merely “more than de minimis.”74
Eleventh Circuit: The Eleventh Circuit referred to Rowley’s FAPE standard 
as the “basic f loor of opportunity standard.”75 Under this standard, school 
districts are not required to maximize educational benefits, but must provide 
some educational benefit measured by the child’s individual needs.76
 The chart below links each circuit’s FAPE standard to the corresponding Rowley 
standard based on the level of educational benefit each circuit interpreted the FAPE 
standard to require. If a circuit has adopted two standards, it is placed in the higher 
of the two groups:
FAPE Standard Circuits
Meaningful benefit in light of the child’s potential Sixth
Meaningful benefit/access First, Second, Third, and Fifth
Benefit Ninth 
Some/more than trivial benefit District of Columbia, Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
70. Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968, 974–75 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); Deal v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004).
71. M.B. v. Hamilton Se. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 862 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n IEP . . . enable[s] the child to 
receive an educational benefit ‘when it is likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational 
advancement.’”) (quoting Alex R. v. Forestville Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th 
Cir. 2004)).
72. Compare M.M. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch., 702 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he IEP must provide some 
educational benefit . . . .”) (quoting Park Hill Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)), with 
K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 810 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no IDEA violation when the 
child “enjoyed more than what we would consider slight or ‘de minimis’ academic progress”).
73. See S.W. v. Governing Bd. of E. Whittier City Sch. Dist., 504 F. App’x 571, 572 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
that IDEA requirements were met when the student’s IEP provided the child “with educational 
benefit”); K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 426 F. App’x 536, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2011); J.L. v. Mercer 
Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010).
74. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘some 
educational benefit’ language in defining a [FAPE] . . . mean[s] that the educational benefit mandated 
by the IDEA must merely be ‘more than de minimis.’”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
75. Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 630 F. App’x 917, 920 (11th Cir. 2015).
76. Id.
40
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With the exception of the Sixth Circuit, every circuit adopted a FAPE standard that 
correlated with one of Rowley’s standards. The Sixth Circuit’s additional component—
that the education be meaningful in light of the child’s potential—foreshadows the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.
V. ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
 Thirty-five years after Rowley, the Supreme Court revisited the question of how 
much education a school district must provide to a student with a disability in order 
to provide a FAPE. In answering this question, it replaced Rowley ’s various 
educational benefit standards with one that requires school districts to design an IEP 
that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light 
of the child’s circumstances.”77
 A. Facts
 Endrew F. involved a child who was diagnosed with autism at age two.78 By the 
time Endrew reached fourth grade, his parents felt that his progress had stalled; his 
IEPs were basically the same from year to year.79 After the school district again 
offered Endrew the same IEP for fifth grade, his parents removed him from the 
public school and placed him in a private school for children with autism.80 Endrew’s 
behavior and academic performance improved at his new school.81
 Endrew’s parents filed an administrative complaint seeking reimbursement from 
the school district for the tuition they paid to the private school.82 They lost at the 
administrative level, the district court, and the Tenth Circuit: Applying its merely 
more than de minimis standard, the court of appeals found that the school district 
had not denied Endrew a FAPE.83
 B. The Supreme Court’s Definition of a FAPE
 The Court in Endrew F. noted that Rowley did not adopt a single standard for 
evaluating whether a school district had provided a FAPE to a child with a disability.84 
It then stated, however, that the IDEA and Rowley “point to a general approach: To 
meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP 
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
77. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
78. Id. at 996.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 996–97.
82. Id. at 997.
83. Id. at 991.
84. Id. at 993, 997–99.
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child’s circumstances.”85 The Court then elaborated on the key elements of its new 
FAPE standard: 1) reasonably calculated; 2) progress; 3) appropriate; and 4) in light 
of the child’s circumstances.
 The Court explained that “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make 
progress” reflects the concept that the IEP is prospective based on the educational 
expertise of school officials and input from parents; although it need not be ideal, an 
IEP must be reasonable in light of the child’s circumstances.86 The Court further 
explained that “progress” is part of the FAPE standard because the role of the IEP is 
to create a program that will help the child to advance academically and functionally.87 
In defining “appropriate progress,” the Court explained that for a child “fully 
integrated in the regular classroom,” the IEP “typically” should allow the child to 
pass his courses and advance to the next grade.88 For children not reasonably expected 
to advance from grade to grade, the IEP is not required to enable the child to do so, 
but “the educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his 
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious 
for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child 
should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”89 The need to view all of this 
through the prism of the “child’s circumstances” is grounded in the IDEA’s 
requirement that the special education the district provides be specifically tailored to 
the child’s needs, that the child’s educational program be individualized, and that 
schools educate children with a wide range of needs.90
 The Court stopped short of describing what an “appropriate” education would 
look like on a case-by-case basis since the appropriateness of an IEP “turns on the 
unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created.”91 The Court rejected 
Endrew’s parents’ argument that the FAPE standard should require districts to 
provide students with disabilities an equivalent opportunity to achieve academically.92 
That standard, the Court pointed out, is similar to what the district court in Rowley 
adopted and virtually identical to Justice Blackmun’s standard in his concurring 
opinion.93 Noting that Congress had not made a statutory change to the definition of 
a FAPE since Rowley, the Court declined to interpret the IDEA in a way that the 
majority of the Court in Rowley rejected.94




89. Id. at 1000.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1001.
92. Id. at 992.
93. Id. at 1001.
94. Id.
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VI. THE LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF ENDREW F.
 Several circuit courts have addressed Endrew F. and its impact on their FAPE 
standards. This Part describes these courts’ responses to Endrew F.95
 A. District of Columbia Circuit
 In Z.B. v. District of Columbia, the court stated that Endrew F. “raised the bar on 
what counts as an adequate education under the IDEA.”96 The court then replaced its 
previous “some educational benefits” standard with Endrew F.’s standard: The IEP 
must be “reasonably calculated to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”97
 B. First Circuit
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not yet considered Endrew F., but a 
district court in the First Circuit has shed light on its significance. In C.D. v. Natick 
Public School District, the district court’s review of the administrative finding was 
pending when Endrew F. was decided.98 Noting the First Circuit’s previous “some 
educational benefit” standard, and that the hearing officer stated that an IEP must be 
“designed to meet the child’s unique needs” and be “reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefit,” the court remanded the case to the hearing officer 
with instructions to determine whether its standard was consistent with Endrew F., 
and if not, to consider the case under the appropriate standard.99
 C. Second Circuit
 The Second Circuit announced its position on Endrew F. in P. v. West Hartford 
Board of Education.100 The court stated that the FAPE standard it had adopted in its 
prior decisions was consistent with Endrew F.’s standard.101 One of the decisions it 
cited, A.M. v. New York City Department of Education, used the “educational benefits” 
standard.102 The other, Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, stated that the 
95. The various standards described in this section are based on decisions that were published as of October 
1, 2018.
96. 888 F.3d 515, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
97. Id. (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999); see also Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 
113, 121 (D.D.C. 2018); Pavelko v. District of Columbia, 288 F. Supp. 3d 301, 307–08 (D.D.C. 2018).
98. No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL 2483551, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2017).
99. Id. at *1–2 (quoting Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23–24 (1st Cir. 
2008)); but see Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012) (adopting 
the meaningful benefit standard); D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (adopting the 
meaningful benefit standard).
100. 885 F.3d 735, 756–57 (2d Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018).
101. Id. at 757.
102. See 845 F.3d 523, 541 (2d Cir. 2017).
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education must be “meaningful.”103 The court then affirmed the decision of the 
district court that the school had provided the child with a FAPE because it provided 
him with a “meaningful educational program that was reasonably calculated to 
enable P. to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”104 In using 
Endrew F.’s standard to determine that the school district had provided the child 
with a FAPE, the court apparently equated its “meaningful” standard with 
“appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”
 D. Third Circuit
 Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed Endrew 
F., district courts in the Third Circuit have been busy doing so. In Montgomery 
County Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. C.M.,105 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania took 
an approach similar to the Second Circuit’s. The court held that the Third Circuit’s 
“meaningful benefit” standard was similar to Endrew F.; thus the hearing officer’s 
FAPE standard that the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential” 
was proper.106 Another court created a test to implement Endrew F.: A school district 
must identify the child’s intellectual potential, evaluate the child’s educational needs, 
and implement a curriculum that produces reasonable progress in light of those 
needs.107 One decision’s analysis provides a roadmap for implementing Endrew F.’s 
appropriate progress test and is worth quoting in detail:
Significantly, the factual record is preponderant that Student “failed to 
progress academically at more than a snail’s pace.” In fact, Student’s progress 
was so incremental there was no reasonable basis to believe that Student could 
reach or accomplish IEP goals within a yearly term. Student’s bench-mark 
scores well below grade expectations and the incremental progress reports on 
IEP goals further support the finding that Student was not receiving a 
meaningful education, was not making satisfactory progress, and was in fact 
falling behind his age and grade peers. . . . Thus, the educational program 
offered to Student during his sixth and seventh grade years was not reasonably 
calculated to allow Student to make appropriate progress under the 
circumstances. At best, the District offered Student an educational program 
promising de minimis academic progress. As such a program is insufficient, 
there is no basis for overturning the Hearing Officer’s Decision.108
103. 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
104. P., 885 F.3d at 757.
105. No. 17-1523, 2017 WL 4548022, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017).
106. Id. at *6.
107. T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 792, 797 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
108. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.W., No. 3:16-CV-0381, 2017 WL 3971089, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 
2017) (internal citations omitted).
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 E. Fourth Circuit
 In a case in which the FAPE standard was not at issue, the Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged that its FAPE standard was similar to the Tenth Circuit’s, which the 
Supreme Court rejected in Endrew F.109 In a case in which the FAPE standard was 
dispositive, a district court in the Fourth Circuit ruled that Endrew F. had overruled 
Rowley.110
 F. Fifth Circuit
 In C.G. v. Waller Independent School District, the court equated its FAPE standard 
with Endrew F.’s.111 The court below had applied the Fifth Circuit’s four-factor 
FAPE analysis, which includes consideration of whether the IEP is individualized 
based on the student’s assessments and academic performance and whether there are 
demonstrative academic and non-academic benefits.112 
 G. Sixth Circuit
 In Barney v. Akron Board of Education, a court in the Sixth Circuit stated that in 
Endrew F., the Supreme Court “revised the Rowley standard for what qualifies as an 
educational benefit” and that “an IEP would be judged as appropriate based on the 
individual child’s potential.”113 Applying this standard, the court found that the 
student was benefitting from individualized instruction and was making measurable 
progress towards annual goals.114
 H. Eighth Circuit
 The Eighth Circuit referred to Endrew F. in a case involving a Minnesota statute, 
but did not issue a ruling on the applicability of Endrew F. in the Eighth Circuit.115 
A district court in the Eighth Circuit did address this issue, and found that Endrew 
109. M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE standard is similar to that of the 
Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F.”).
110. See J.R. v. Smith, No. DKC 16-1633, 2017 WL 3592453, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017) (“[E]ven though 
the ALJ made her decision prior to the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Endrew F. standard, she 
went beyond the ‘more than de minimus’ [sic] standard . . . and laid out an approach that evaluated what 
progress was appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances, just as Endrew F. requires.”).
111. 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017).
112. Id. 
113. No. 5:16CV0112, 2017 WL 4226875, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2017).
114. Id. 
115. See I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017).
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F. overruled the Eighth Circuit’s de minimis standard.116 Other district courts in the 
Eighth Circuit have applied the Endrew F. standard as well.117
 I. Ninth Circuit
 The Ninth Circuit’s response to Endrew F. has been inconsistent, but the weight 
of authority in the Ninth Circuit is that Endrew F. replaced its “educational benefit” 
FAPE standard. One decision ruled that Endrew F. clarified but did not overrule 
Rowley and that the Ninth Circuit’s FAPE standard is consistent with Endrew F.118 
On the other hand, three decisions explicitly adopted Endrew F. without addressing 
whether it changed the Ninth Circuit’s FAPE standard.119 Two of these decisions 
developed tests to determine whether a school district met Endrew F.’s FAPE 
standard. In Rachel H., the court stated that Endrew F. requires an IEP team to 
consider the child’s achievement levels, describe how the child’s disability affects the 
child’s ability to perform, and set measurable goals.120 In M.C., the court interpreted 
Endrew F. to require a school to “implement an IEP that is reasonably calculated to 
remediate and, if appropriate, accommodate the child’s disabilities so that the child 
can ‘make progress in the general education curriculum,’ taking into account the 
progress of his non-disabled peers, and the child’s potential.”121
 J. Tenth Circuit
 On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court in Endrew F. articulated 
the “new legal standard” for a FAPE: A child in a regular classroom should pass 
from grade to grade; the IEP for a child not in the regular classroom should be 
appropriately ambitious in light of the child’s circumstances; an IEP must enable the 
child to make progress; and the progress must be appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.122 Applying this standard, the court ruled that the district failed to 
provide Endrew F. a FAPE.123
116. See Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017).
117. E.g., D.L. v. St. Louis City Pub. Sch. Dist., 326 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820–21 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 2018); 
Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV-3011, 2017 WL 2880853, at *2 (W.D. Ark. July 
5, 2017).
118. See E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 726 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2018).
119. See J.M. v. Mayatoshi, 729 F. App’x 585, 586 (9th Cir. 2018); Rachel H. v. Dep’t of Educ., 868 F.3d 
1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2017); M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 12 01 (9th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 556 (2017).
120. 868 F.3d at 1089.
121. 858 F.3d at 1201 (internal citations omitted).
122. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181 (D. Col. Feb. 12, 2018).
123. Id. at 1186.
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 K. Eleventh Circuit
 The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed Endrew F., but a district court noted 
the significant difference between its previous more than de minimis standard and 
Endrew F.’s standard.124 Nonetheless, the court ruled that deference to the 
administrative law judge’s decision issued under the previous standard was appropriate 
as long as the legal implications of the findings were evaluated in accordance with 
Endrew F.125
 L. Post-Endrew F. Summary
 The following chart summarizes the circuit courts’ responses to Rowley and 
Endrew F. If a circuit is italicized, it means that the court of appeals has not yet 
addressed the issue and the conclusion is based on a district court opinion. An asterisk 
indicates that a circuit adopted the meaningful benefit standard post-Rowley, but after 
Endrew F., articulated its standard by using Endrew F.’s appropriate progress language.
Circuit Post-Rowley Post-Endrew F.
District of Columbia Some benefit Appropriate progress
First Meaningful benefit Appropriate progress[?]
Second Meaningful benefit Meaningful benefit*
Third Meaningful benefit Meaningful benefit*
Fourth Some/more than trivial benefit Appropriate progress
Fifth Meaningful benefit Meaningful benefit*
Sixth Meaningful benefit in light of 
the child’s potential
Appropriate progress
Seventh Some/more than trivial benefit N/A
Eighth Some/more than trivial benefit Appropriate progress
Ninth Benefit Appropriate progress
Tenth Some/more than trivial benefit Appropriate progress
Eleventh Some/more than trivial benefit Appropriate progress
This chart shows the pervasive impact of Endrew F. All of the circuits that had 
adopted a FAPE standard requiring some or more than trivial benefit have adopted 
the appropriate progress standard. The circuits that had adopted the meaningful 
benefit standard have maintained that standard, but now phrase it in appropriate 
progress terms.
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VII. DID ENDREW F. OPEN THE DOOR TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES?
 Rowley closed the door for at least thirty-five years on the possibility of equal 
educational opportunity for students with disabilities pursuant to the IDEA. Endrew 
F. stated that the door remains closed, but an analysis of the meaning of equal 
educational opportunity for children with disabilities—in conjunction with Endrew 
F.’s own language and the tests that some courts have developed to implement it—
suggest that the next step in the evolution of the FAPE standard is equality of 
educational opportunity.
 The Constitution does not require our public schools to offer equal educational 
opportunities to all students.126 The educational opportunities that are available 
differ vastly among different school districts due to a number of factors, including 
financial resources, demographics, and availability of teaching resources.127 In this 
sense, the concept of equality of educational opportunity for children with disabilities 
is an elusive one: Equal to what? Framed in the context of the IDEA’s purpose to 
open the schoolhouse door to children with disabilities and provide them with an 
appropriate education, and as described in Justice White’s dissent in Rowley, the 
concept of equal educational opportunity in special education is a local one: Children 
with disabilities should receive the same educational opportunity as typically-
developing children in their school.
 In describing the FAPE standard for children whose disabilities make it unlikely 
that they will be able to pass from grade to grade, the Court in Endrew F. stated, “The 
goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging 
objectives.”128 This language plausibly describes the educational standard for public 
education. Many school districts, regardless of their resource constraints, might already 
be following this standard. All children, typically-developing and children with 
disabilities alike, are entitled to an opportunity to meet challenging objectives, which, 
by their very nature, are based on the capacity of the children to whom they apply.
 District courts in the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted detailed 
tests for determining if a child has received a FAPE, all of which move in the 
direction of an equal educational opportunity standard. The Third and Fifth 
Circuits’ tests generally require a school district to evaluate a child and determine her 
potential, develop a program to make progress towards meeting that potential, and 
measure the outcome.129 It is plausible that many public school districts already seek 
to provide educational programs that help all students reach their potential. The 
126. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
127. See Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach et al., Fourteen Economic Facts on Education and 
Economic Opportunity 15 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
education_facts.pdf (explaining that state educational expenditures per student vary due to a state’s 
relative wealth); Alice Yin, Education by the Numbers, N.Y. Times Mag. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/08/magazine/education-by-the-numbers.html (“Minority students are more 
likely to be taught by inexperienced teachers . . . in thirty-three states.”). 
128. 137 S. Ct. 988, 992 (2017).
129. See C.G. v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017); T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 792, 797 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
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Ninth Circuit’s test explicitly adopts an equality test: It requires school districts to 
offer children with disabilities an educational program that “is reasonably calculated 
to remediate and, if appropriate, accommodate the child’s disabilities so that the 
child can ‘make progress in the general education curriculum,’ . . . taking into account 
the progress of his non-disabled peers, and the child’s potential.”130 This test could 
be challenged as going beyond what Endrew F. allows, but perhaps it could withstand 
scrutiny. It does not require equality but lists equality as one factor to consider.
VIII. CONCLUSION
 Endrew F. is a landmark decision that will likely guide special education law for 
the next two generations, as most circuit courts have already implemented its FAPE 
standard. It also opens the door to requiring equal educational opportunity for 
children with disabilities, a goal that Congress had for children when it passed the 
IDEA more than forty years ago. Ultimately, the full potential of Endrew F. will be 
realized with the continued dedication, commitment, and hard work of parents, 
educators, advocates, and children, who bring the IDEA to life.
130. M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 12 01 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 556 (2017).
